Oracle Announces 2018 Oracle Excellence Awards – Congratulations to our “Leadership in ... - We are pleased to announce the 2018 Oracle Excellence Awards “Leadership in Infrastructure Transformation" Winners. This elite group of recipients includ...
Friday, May 19, 2017
ICMC17: Keynote: From Heartbleed to Juniper and Beyond
Matthew Green, Johns Hopkins University.
Kleptography - the study of stealing cryptographic secrets. Most people did not think the government was really doing this. But, we do know there was a company, Crypto AG, that worked with the NSA on their cipher machines available between 1950s and 1980s.
Snowden's leak contained documents referring to SIGINT - a plan to insert back doors into commercial encryption devises and add vulnerabilities into standards.
How can the government do this? We can't really change existing protocols, but you can mandate use of specific algorithms. This brings us to the 'Achilles heel' of crypto - (P)RNG. If that's broken, everything is broken.
There are two ways to subvert an RNG - attack the lower level TRNG or the PRNG. The TRNG is probabilistic and hardware specific and too much variance. The PRNG/DRBG is software and everyone has to use a specific one to comply with US Government standards - a more appealing target.
Young and Yung predicted an attack against the DRBG and how it might work in the 1990s - where you could use internal state, a master key and a trap door will let you decrypt the data. This sounds a lot like Dual EC DRBG. It was almost immediately identified as having this weakness - if the values were not chosen correctly. NSA chose the values - and we trusted them.
Snowden leaks found documents referring to "challenge of finesse" regarding pushing this backdoor through a standards body. Most of us don't have to worry about the government snooping on us, but ... what if someone else could leverage this back door?
This is what happened when Juniper discovered unauthorized code in their ScreenOS that allowed an attacker to passively decrypt VPN traffic. Analysis of the code changes discovered that Juniper changed the parameters for DUAL EC DRBG. But, Juniper said they didn't use Dual EC DRBG, according to their security policy, other than as input into 3DES (which should cover anything bad from DRBG). The problem came up when a global variable was used in a for loop (bad idea), which in effect means the for loop that was supposed to do the 3DES mixing never runs (as the Dual EC DRBG subroutine also uses the same global variable).
More specifically, there are issues with how IKE was implemented. The impacted version, ScreenOS 6.2 (the version that adds Dual EC DRBG) adds a pre-generation nonce.
Timeline: 1996 Young and Yung propose the attack, 1998 Dual EC DRBG developed at NSA, 2007 became a final NISt standard, 2008 Juniper added Dual EC DRBG and it was exploited in 2012 and not discovered until 2015.
Before Dual EC DRBG, people used ANSI X9.31 - which had a problem if you used a fixed K, someone can recover the state and subvert the systems.
How do we protect ourselves? We should build protocols that are more resilient to bad RNG (though that's not what is happening). But maybe protocols are not the issue - maybe it's how we're doing the validation. Look at FortiOS, who had a hard coded key in their devices, which was used for testing FIPS requirements, and documented it in their security policy.