J. Alex Halderman, Assistant Professor, Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan, started the talk out with a look back at his family history. Apparently his great-grandfather was an illegitimate of a noble and artist, and his grandmother was a spy. As a grad student, back in 2003, he was working on DRM technologies (at the time made to protect CDs - remember those?).
These early copy protections could be easily over-ridden with felt tip markers or by pressing the shift key while inserting a disk. Halderman wrote about this online, and was quickly threatened with lawsuits by the DCMA and the company that had created the DRM technology (their slogan was "Light years beyond encryption").
The next round of DRM technology would install software onto your computer to prevent you from copying CDs - in the form of a rootkit that munged with your registry. Not only was that software doing things that that weren't disclosed, but they also introduced privilege escalation bugs, and if you did uninstall the software, it would leave a remotely executable vulnerability on your desktop.
"Most people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so why should they care about it?" - Thomas Hess, Sony.
Halderman, by publishing these issues, caused Sony to have to recall millions of CDs over the holiday season and brought government oversite into the industry. To the best of his knowledge, attempts at putting DRM software onto CDs has been dropped by the industry. [VAF: though I have seen these recently on CDs I've purchased, at least labeled that it had copy protection.]
Since then, Halderman has been focusing on voting machines, all the way back to the old machines with the big pull levers. In that time, most of the requirements around "robustness" had to do with machines working in hot or cold weather and not losing data if they were dropped.
After the 2000 election debacle, may electronic voting machines were rushed to market without adequate testing and without a third party security review. The code was put up online accidentally by Diebold, and people found many mistakes quite quickly. Diebold claimed the software was out of date and threatened to sue many of the people who had found issues.
In 2008, Halderman and two other researchers finally got their hands on an actual Diebold Accuvote machine, which he acquired from a man in Times Square wearing a trench coat in an alley.... really.
Realizing how litigious Diebold was, the researchers performed their experiments on the machine in a room (missing from the building blue prints) in the basement of their building.
They were able to discover a method to set the percentage of votes they wanted one candidate to get at the end of the voting period, all the while, the paper tape was printing the correct numbers for those voting.
Another method of attack could be done with just 30 seconds of access to the machine with a memory card that would overwrite the voting machine's memory.
Finally, they were able to come up with a voting machine virus that would self-propagate to every voting machine.
Despite these findings, these machines are still used state wide in at least Maryland.
Diebold argued that the box had security in the form of a lock, but the researchers found you could pick the lock with a lock pick set in 10-15 seconds, a little longer with a paper clip. But, why bother? All boxes had the same key, and that same key was also used on minibars and jukeboxes - readily available for purchase on the Internet.
Debra Bowen, Secretary of State in California, took this research to heart and began a full audit of all of California's voting machines and demand e-voting machine manufacturers to provide source code for analysis. The California review found that it wasn't just Diebold that had issues, but all manufacturers of electronic voting machines.
Halderman and other researchers were able to obtain voting machines for next to nothing at various government surplus sales. In one case, they thought, why bother doing this again? We know the box will be insecure. So, instead, the got the voting machine to boot Linux, start X and run a PacMan emulator.... :-)
As states can't seem to find enough bugs in physical electronic voting machines, places like Washington, D.C. wanted to try Internet voting last year. Luckily for Halderman and his grad students, D.C. put the system online a few weeks in advance of voting to allow people to attempt to attack the system.
The students discovered the router passwords were "cisco123" and that there was a publicly accessible webcam in the server rooms. By watching the server rooms for a few days, they knew the schedule of the admin (shown in the talk picking his nose) and when security went home. So, they could launch their attack after 5PM.
They were able to put in false ballots *and* get the system to send them copies of other people's votes. The ballots were encrypted on the server, but the temporary copy of the ballots were not...
Halderman and his researchers did not let D.C. folks know that they were in active attack mode, but wanted to see how long it would take them to notice. They modified the "Thank You for Voting" page to play Michigan's fight song after every vote. It took two days for them to discover this, only because another tester complained to the authorities that he didn't like the new music they'd put on the page - it was annoying.
That still may not have been enough to stop them from deploying. It was also discovered that one of their internal testers wanted to make sure the system wouldn't crash if someone uploaded a very large PDF file, so he uploaded the biggest file he could find... which happened to be the real voter credentials for the election. So, the e-voting was called off... for last year. Wonder what 2011 will hold?
Halderman broke from election talk to tell us about his recent adventures in airports, including filming TSA agents (who don't like to be filmed patting people down, because they feel their privacy is being violated) and wandering around parts of airports that were meant to be secured, but weren't (doors unlocked and security guards were asleep).
Halderman and another researcher went to India to study their electronic voting machines, which previously had not been evaluated by independent researchers. They were able to get their hands on some actual voting systems, and did find that the software was hardcoded into the hardware during manufacturing. So, they attacked the LED display that shows you how many votes each candidate got by making a lookalike board that had chips hidden under the LEDs and a blue tooth transmitter, so you could remotely stack the votes.
The person in India, Hari, who had helped them get access to the voting machine was taken into custody by police a short time later. Fortunately, all ended well for Hari, but it must have been a terrible time while he was in custody. This, of course, led to Halderman being denied future access to India, which he discovered the next time he traveled there.
This was a very entertaining talk, done mostly with pictures, yet it was still very easy to follow. A delight! Once this talk is posted online, definitely check it out!
The audio and video of this presentation are now online.
This article is syndicated from Thoughts on security, beer, theater and biking!
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