Presented by Alessandro Acquisti, Associate Professor of Information Technology and Public Policy at Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University.
Acquisti asks what are the trade-offs associated with protecting and sharing personal information? How, rationally, do we calculate the risk and benefits?
You can look at it from a economics point of view. Acquisti starts with an example from a paper called Guns, Privacy and Crime, analyzing where the state of Tennessee released the names and zip codes of all people that had handgun carry permits. The NRA was outraged, as well as privacy experts, saying this information would make these people at more risk for crime - newspapers believed it would be the opposite. Acquisti and his colleagues studied this and found a direct relation between crime in those areas - that is, crime went *up* in areas with low gun ownership. Obviously, the criminals knew the risk was lower to themselves in those neighborhoods. I'm sure that's not what the state of Tennessee was going for.
The conundrum here, of course, is that different people value their privacy at different levels. He asks us to consider: "Willingness to accept (WTA) money to give away information" vs. "Willingness to pay (WTP) money to protect information." In theory, they should be the same, but in practice, they believed people have a higher WTP.
Acquisti and his colleagues did an experiment at a local shopping mall where they rewarded survey participants gift cards as a reward. One group received a $10 gift card that would not be traced, and the other group was given $12 card that would have the transactions tracked and linked to your name, and they were given the option to swap.
So, while they're both actually being given the same choice, it was psychologically framed differently when presented. People who were originally given the $12 card very rarely wanted to give up the $12 to get their privacy back, while those that started with the $10 card wanted to keep it. If you have less privacy, you value privacy less. McNeally's famous quote, "You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it," came up.
Another area they were curious about was is the Internet really the end of forgetting? That is, memories fade, but Facebook doesn't. I've said this over & over again to teenagers, "The Internet is forever." What the researchers wanted to see was that if people would discount the information if it was old. Their hypothesis was that bad information would be discounted more slowly than good information. For example, if you last received an award 10 years ago, people may say, "Yeah, but what have they done lately," compared to being caught drunk driving, for which you may not ever be forgiven.
Their researchers did three experiments: the dictator game (with real money), the company experiment (judging a real company, but no real money involved), and the wallet experiment (where subjects read about someone doing something either good or bad with a wallet and then judge him).
In the wallet experiment, even though all of this information is fresh on the mind of the subjects, they found that if they said Mr. A did something positive with a found wallet 5 years ago (returning cash found), does not impact people's feelings about Mr. A, whereas if he had done it recently, they would have a more positive view of him. But, if he did something negative (like keeping the cash), it didn't matter if it happened last year or 5 years ago - people did not like this Mr. A.
The lesson learned here is that be careful about letting negative information about yourself from getting on the Internet, as people will not forgive your past indiscretions. The speaker gave specific examples of the Facebook meme where young women post pictures of themselves when they are out of control drunk and passed out or worse. Even as they grow up and mature, they will not be forgiven for those past indiscretions.
And, with computer facial tagging getting better and better, even untagging yourself won't prevent you from being recognized.
The researchers studied public Facebook profile pictures along with their IDs and compared them to publicly known pictures of those people to see if people are using their real picture - they were able to discover that about 85% of them were accurate images. This could be further leveraged to see if people are using their own real picture on dating sites :)
What this means, is that even if you change your name, you still won't be able to escape your face (well, not without significant cost and potentially negative consequences).
The better and faster that facial recognition software gets, the less privacy we will have in public. Someone you just met could look you up by your face and learn all sorts of information about you. Scary!
The audio and video of this presentation are now online.
This article is syndicated from Thoughts on security, beer, theater and biking!
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