KMIP 2.0 vs Crypto in a Cybersecurity Context (G23c) Tony Cox, Cryptsoft, Australia; Chuck White, Fornetix, United States
They are both co-editors of the KMIP v 2.0 version of the specification. They are big fans of standards.
Wrapped up KMIP v1.4 in March 2017 (published in November 2017) and scoped KMIP 2.0. In January 2018, KMIP 2.0 working draft is out and had another face to face in April 2018.
Restructured the documents, removed legacy 1.x artifacts. Problems we create today will impact us for the next 10-15 years, so working with that in mind. Want a way to be able to make changes easily as needed in the future. The focus is on data in motion. We want to lower barrier for adoption, and make KMIP more accessible as a service with flow control and signaling for transaction of Encryption Keys and Cryptographic Operations.
Passwords are now sent as hashed passwords, including a nonce to prevent replay. We have an effective double hash, so no longer need to store passwords in the clear. We've had the concept of OTP (One Time Password) for a long time, but it's better defined to make it easier to use and interoperate.
We've also addressed login and delegated rights. Login is a simple mechanism to reduce authentications. Leveraging tickets to improve performance. Allows for delegation and supports 2FA. This will broaden KMIP applicability.
Flow control allows server initiated commands to clients with the client initiated connections. Allows the server to be a trust node managing encryption keys on other devices that are inside or outside a system perimeter. Best of all - does not break the existing method of establishing a KMIP session (does not break clients).
Multiple ID Placeholders allows for simpler execution of compound key management operations. Provides a path to combine traditional key management operations and HSM operations into a single KMIP operations. Addressing broader concern of IoT and Cloud. Also added some changes to make dealing with offline devices easier.
Digest values usable between client and server - deterministic. Clients can rely on servers! Addresses a major source of non-interoperability.
There is now a concept of re-encrypt. What happens when you have an object that's been encrypted, and you want to rotate the keys? Don't want to expose keys while doing transitions. This new method allows the keys to stay in the server (w/in the FIPS boundary). Enabling rekeying more often. This is future proofing for post quantum crypto when we know people will need to rekey.
There are some default crypto parameters, allows parameter agnostic clients. Cryptography can change on the server side and not change the method in which it is requested by the client. Server can provide defaults if the client does not.
All of these features were to improve crypto agility and resilience, easier to use, and allows KMIP to be more impactful for Data in Motion, IoT, Distributed Compute and Cloud.
Implementation work is starting next, along with final reviews and hopefully close out any final issues in the next few months. Hope to publish in 2018!
This work is the culmination of our efforts and learnings in the key management space over the last 9 years as a standard's body. But, if you have requirements the standard is not handling, come and join us or let us know what the issues are.
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