TLS 1.3 and NSS (S30a) Robert Relyea, Red Hat, United States
PKCS#11 is the FIPS boundary for NSS. AES/GCM presents a difficulty in the PKCS#11 v2.X API, but will be addressed in v3.X. While in FIPS mode, keys are locked tot he token and cannot be removed in the clear. This means their SSL implementation doesn't have actual access to the keys - so MACing, etc, needs to happen within NSS's softtoken.
In NSS's FIPS mode, only allowed FIPS algorithms were on. This caused problems for accessing things like ChaCha, so now they are only locked in the security policy.
The TLS 1.3 engine in NSS is very different than 1.2. We rewrote the handshake handling state machine. We have finally dropped support for SSL 2.0 support altogether and have notified customers that SSL 3.0 is next (currently turned off). TLS 1.3 uses a different KDF as well, already had support for HKDF through a private PKCS#11 NSS Mechanism. Essentially, everything (but the record format) has changed.
The implementation was done by Mozilla, primarily by Eric Rescorla and Martin Thompson. They had to rewrite the state machine. We wanted customers to start playing with the software, but due to the way it's configured, they sometimes got it on accident (by applications choosing the highest available version of TLS).
When will you see this? It's fairly complete in the NSS upstream code, but nobody has released it, yet. Draft 28 of TLS 1.3 was posted on March 30, 2018. We doubt there will be any further technical changes. The current PKCS#11 is sufficient, other than the KDF. The PKCS#11 v3.0 spec should be out by the end of 2018. Still gathering final proposals and review comments into the draft. HKDF missed the cutout... Bob will work on taking HKDF through the PKCS#11 process as the 3.0 review moves forward, to hit the next version of the specification.
How do you influence NSS? The more you contribute, the bigger say you can get to influence the direction.
A Christmas Caro - If you think *you're* tired of Christmas songs, think of the poor Wreckerators. They have to deal with this one all year long: [image: ambercou.ow.alabam...